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TOWARD A CLEAR STANDARD OF OBVIOUSNESS FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
The term "biotechnology" refers to scientific activity that manipu-
lates living systems and yields useful biological products or processes.
Since the discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA in 1959,
biotechnology has experienced exponential growth. This unprece-
dented expansion of knowledge has generated large financial re-
search costs.1 Accompanying these costs, conflict has arisen over
ownership and use of the newly discovered information. During the
1980s, patents have emerged as an important and controversial tool
for protecting this knowledge.2 Rapid scientific advances underscore
the need to clarify the legal standards for determining the ownership
and use of valuable scientific information. By explicitly acknowledg-
ing that patent analysis properly embraces the methods, and not final
products, of scientific research, the Federal Circuit can establish a
clear standard that will aid the biotechnology industry.
Through a series of four recent cases,3 the Federal Circuit has
attempted to apply the broad statutory language of patent law to the
unique needs of biotechnology.4 The most contentious issue relates
1 In 1992, the average cost of discovering and bringing a single drug to market ex-
ceeded $230 million. This amount has increased as 1990 United States' biotechnology
sales reached $2.9 billion. Biotechnology Plant Protection Act, H.R REP. No. 260, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1992).
2 See generally Nicholas H. Carey & Peter E. Crawley, Commercial Exploitation of the
Human Genome: What are the Problems?, in HuMAN GENETIC INFORMATION: SCIENCE, LAW AND
ETHics 133-47 (Ciba Foundation Symposium 149) (1990) (assessing the industry's need for
patents in commercial fields where the high cost and long time frames of research require
exclusive ownership rights to achieve an acceptable investment return); Reid G. Adler,
Cenome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expectations for Knowledge and Commercialization, 257
SCIENCE 908 (1992) (summarizing academic and industry positions on patent law and argu-
ing that careful development of policies is needed to successfully encourage commercial
product development). "[D]ue consideration must be given to protecting the market ex-
clusivity necessary for the private sector to risk enormous sums of money in product devel-
opment efforts." Id. at 908.
3 Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987) (assay using monoclonal antibodies is non-obvious); In re
O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (expression of fused foreign protein in bacteria is
obvious); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (DNA sequence for the erythropoietin protein is a non-obvious in-
vention); In reVaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (expression of an insecticide protein in
cyanobacteria is non-obvious). For discussion and explanation of these cases see infra sec-
tion III.
4 The Federal Circuit is the Federal Court of Appeals for all cases involving patent
disputes. Generally, patent disputes arise from either infringement action initiated at the
district court level or an appeal from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office deny-
ing a patent application. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982
by the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982), and
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to the standard of "obviousness."5 This involves a legal determination
of whether an invention would have been obvious in light of knowledge
in the relevant field at that time.6 An obvious invention is not
patentable.
Despite the crucial importance of obviousness for determining
biotechnology patent rights, the Federal Circuit has failed to elucidate
a clear test for this analysis. This failure can be attributed to the
unique nature of biotechnology and the problems that genetic inven-
tions pose. The Federal Circuit analyzes these cases under the rubric
of conventional analysis. However, biotechnology differs from con-
ventional technology in ways that make generic obviousness analysis
inapt. The unclear and occasionally confused nature of obviousness
analysis leads to misapplication of the law and industry uncertainty in
this vital and growing field.
This Note argues that a better approach to obviousness can be
drawn from the reasoning underlying the four biotechnology cases
resolved in the Federal Circuit. The thesis of this Note is that determi-
nation of the obviousness of an invention should hinge on the availa-
bility of scientific methods that would have allowed ordinarily skilled
scientists to produce the invention. A two-factor legal analysis com-
prises this standard. First, someone must have already suggested the
invention, either implicitly or explicitly, for it to be viewed as obvious
to attempt. Second, that suggestion must be coupled with a reason-
able expectation of success before the invention can be found legally
obvious. The expectation of success can be measured by the availabil-
ity of techniques that are reasonably likely to accomplish the suggestion. Thus,
to be nonobvious, a claimed biotechnology invention must be unat-
tainable through use of reasonably accessible scientific methods.
Confusion may arise because this standard necessitates inquiry
into the methods of DNA discovery. Conventional obviousness analysis
looks not at the process of invention, but at the obviousness of the
invention product itself. By explicitly acknowledging that obviousness
analysis properly evaluates the methods of scientific research, the Fed-
eral Circuit can establish a clear and workable standard that will aid
merged the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the Court of Claims. See
PAUL GoLDsTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRAIDanmm AND RELATED STATE DocrTaN.s 198-99
(1990).
5 The holdings of the four cases, see supra note 3, all hinged on the obviousness
question. Additionally, a commentator has identified obviousness as one of the the "more
commonplace grounds" for patent rejection. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and
Product Developmen 257 SCIENCE 903, 905 (1992) (assessing the controversy surrounding
the National Institute of Health's application for thousands of small, functionally-un-
known, stretches of DNA).
6 To obtain a patent, an invention cannot have been obvious at the time of inven-
tion. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). See, e.g., Monoclona4 802 F.2d at 1379. For an overview of
statutory requirements for patents see infra section II.
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the biotechnology industry. In light of the growing investment in bio-
technology, the need for a legal standard that will reduce uncertain-
ties about ownership and use of genetic information is readily
apparent.
This Note begins by first providing a general overview of molecu-
lar biology. Presuming the scientific knowledge of an informed
layperson, this section introduces the basic principles and terms of
biotechnology research. The second section briefly describes the
United States patent system. The third section examines the four Fed-
eral Circuit cases to show that a clear analysis for obviousness can be
gleaned from the opinions. In each case, the biotechnology invention
at issue and the court's methods of evaluation are closely analyzed.
The final section assesses how the proposed obviousness standard can
foster efficient processing of applications for biotechnology patents,
especially those relating to genetic sequences. Additionally, this sec-
tion demonstrates how the standard could promote further invest-
ment in biotechnology and yet remain flexible to accommodate the
changing needs of this growing field.
I
SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
The long, thin molecule, deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, exists in
every cell in every organism. This molecule provides the blueprint for
all species of life. Transferred from generation to generation, DNA
contains the template for the proteins that are produced in every cell.
Proteins provide cell structure. They transform food and light into
usable energy. They transport oxygen through blood to muscles. In
short, every living action depends on proteins and every protein has a
unique and vital function. The selective production and regulation of
proteins by the DNA template controls how we grow, develop, and stay
"alive." 7
The DNA molecule consists of four smaller subunits.8 These can
be arranged in any order along the length of the molecule. This or-
der provides a readable code for an exact protein structure. A combi-
nation of three subunits, called a "codon," codes for one of twenty
amino acids.9
7 For an introduction to the vast scope of protein function, see LUBERT STRYER, BiO-
CHEMISTRY 15-16 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter BIOCHEMISTRY].
8 These are adenine, guanine, thymine, and cytosine (A, G, T, and C). See DAVID T.
SuzuIu Er AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYsis 188-92 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
GENac ANALYSIs] (providing a clear and comprehensive overview of DNA structure); see
also WILIAM T. KEETON & JAMES L. GouLD, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 697-701 (4th ed. 1986)
(describing the Watson-Crick model of DNA).
9 An astute reader might notice that there are 64 possible combinations of the four
bases and yet there are only 20 amino acids. As it turns out, each amino acid can be coded
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The order of codons along a stretch of DNA provides a template
for a specific protein. 10 For instance, just as each signal of the Morse
code corresponds to a letter of the alphabet, each codon corresponds
to a specific amino acid. Thus, the specific ordering of Morse code
signals creates an understandable message. Similarly, a specific order-
ing of DNA subunits can create a cohesive, functional protein."
The order of the DNA subunits provides for each protein's struc-
ture. The structure of each protein, then, corresponds to a unique
segment of DNA. The DNA molecule can self-replicate and passes
from generation to generation. 12 In this way, the code for the struc-
ture of all an organism's proteins remains stable and guarantees the
continued existence of the species.
Genetic diseases arise from mutations in the code sequence of
DNA.' 3 This gives rise to dysfunctional proteins. The DNA molecule
is not completely stable and, thus, is susceptible to alterations, or "mu-
tation." Unfortunately, the mutation of just one base in a gene se-
quence can have disastrous consequences for the protein.
For example, instead of a three subunit sequence coding for the
amino acid Valine, it might, upon mutation of a single subunit, code
for Alanine. 14 This results in the insertion of a wrong amino acid into
the protein. If the substitution occurs in a vital region, the entire
function of the protein may be lost. A vivid example of such a muta-
tion is sickle cell anemia. In this genetic disease, one sequence
change results in an amino acid substitution. 15 This substitution alters
the physical shape of the protein, hemoglobin. As a result, the abnor-
mal protein transforms the normal "donut" shape of red blood cells
into a curved sickle shape. 16 The oxygen transportation function of
for by multiple base combinations. For instance, GAA and GAG both code for glutamic
acid. Also, there are three combinations called "stop codons" that signal the end of that
particular readable sequence. For a discussion of the genetic code, see KEETON & GOULD,
supra note 8, at 715-17.
10 A series of incisive studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s revealed that
the amino acid sequences of proteins are genetically determined. The se-
quence of nucleotides in DNA... specifies the amino acid sequence of a
protein.... In particular, each of the twenty amino acids of the repertoire
is encoded by one or more specific sequences of three nucleotides [A, G, T,
or C].
BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 7, at 23.
11 GENETIC ANALYSIs, supra note 8, at 212-15 (the order of subunits creates a protein's
structure which determines the protein's function).
12 KEETON & GOULD, supra note 8, at 615.
13 Id. at 724-26 (describing the inherent instability of DNA).
14 See id. at 717 (this table lays out the entire genetic code which is uniform for all
species).
15 See GENETIc ANAiYsis, supra note 8, at 212-14.
16 KEETON & GOULD, supra note 8, at 673 (describing how the secondary structure of a
single protein affects the form and function of an entire blood cell).
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the protein is lost and this results in serious medical problems for suf-
ferers of the disease. 17
Scientists can develop treatments for this and other diseases by
discovering and manipulating the relevant DNA code sequences.
Since the discovery of DNA's double helical structure, knowledge
about DNA's properties and functions has increased dramatically.
Through various techniques, researchers can now locate, decipher,
and manipulate DNA sequences.' 8 Scientists today are very con-
cerned with locating genes19 and deciphering their sequences.20 This
can be done by a process called "cloning."2' The general idea is to
locate and isolate a particular stretch of DNA that codes for a desired
protein.
Scientists can analyze a known protein structure to determine the
amino acid sequence. Since every protein consists of an ordered
chain of amino acids, a known amino acid sequence can be "read" to
generate the approximate corresponding DNA sequence. This se-
quence can then be used to reveal the chromosomal location of the
actual gene.22 This gene sequence can then be isolated and purified.
When a DNA sequence becomes known, it may be reproduced.
Once reproduced, a sequence can be transferred into another living
cell.23 Scientists can then induce the cell to translate24 the foreign
DNA and produce the sought after protein in vast, purified amounts.
This protein can then be used for pharmaceutical or other benefit.
An example will illustrate the practical benefit of cloning genes.25
Erythropoietin is a protein that boosts red blood cell production. Per-
sons with anemia have a red blood cell deficiency and some need to
17 Sickle-cell anemia can cause heart failure, kidney failure, brain damage, and early
death. See GENETIC ANALysis, supra note 8, at 212-13.
18 See generally id. at 296-328 (describing various current scientific procedures of ge-
netic manipulation).
19 "Gene" is a surprisingly elusive word to define. See, e.g., KEETON & Gour-I, supra
note 8, at 113 ("the basic units of heredity"); GENETIC ANALYsis, supra note 8, at 578 ("a
segment of DNA, composed of a transcribed region and a regulatory sequence, that makes
possible transcription"). Thus, the "gene" for a certain protein is that specific stretch of
DNA that codes for the protein and allows for its accurate reproduction within the cell.
20 DNA sequence information can lead to the development of useful pharmaceutical
protein products. For this reason the sequence information can be very valuable.
21 See generally GENmC ANALysiS, supra note 8, at 298-315 (discussion of the scientific
goals and techniques of cloning).
22 Id. at 312.
23 This process is called "transformation." BIOCHEMIS-RY, supra note 7, at 133-34.
24 "Translation" is part of the biochemical process that produces an amino acid chain
from a DNA template. KEETON & GouuD, supra note 8, at 715. Briefly, the DNA sequence
is "transcribed" onto an interim molecule, RNA. This interim molecule is then translated
into amino acids. Id.
25 This set of facts is taken from the patent dispute between Amgen Co. and Genetics
Institute. SeeAmgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991),
discussed infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
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take erythropoietin as a medical treatment. Potential sales for this
pharmaceutical drug exceed $1 billion a year.26 Targeting this com-
mercial potential, biotechnology companies can invest in research to
discover the genetic basis for the erythropoietin protein. Once the
genetic basis is discovered, the protein can be reproduced quickly and
cheaply and sold to sufferers of anemia. If a patent issues for the dis-
covery, that company will have the exclusive right to sell erythropoie-
tin and exploit a lucrative market for seventeen years. 27
Due to the replicability of genetic information, knowledge and
ownership of DNA sequences has tremendous value. The owner of
such information can utilize the sequence code to manipulate living
systems for commercial benefit. Under the protection of intellectual
property laws, the owner of an isolated stretch of DNA can exclusively
control all use of that sequence by others.
II
BAsIc ELEMENTs OF U.S. PATENT LAW
The Constitution directs that Congress shall have power "[t] o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 28 Title 35 of the United States Code codi-
fied the granting of patents to inventors for their discoveries.
Incorporated into protectible inventions, specific DNA sequences
can be individually owned. Patents provide the tool for ownership of
information generated by biotechnology research. A number of statu-
tory requirements exist for patent protection. These include a show-
ing of appropriate statutory subject matter and the usefulness, novelty,
and nonobviousness of the invention.
A patent does not give exclusive ownership of an invention to the
inventor. Rather, a patent gives the right to exclude others from
"making, using, or selling" the invention for seventeen years.29 In ex-
change for this governmental grant, the inventor must fully disclose to
the public all aspects of the invention. In essence, a patent is an ex-
change of a temporary monopoly in consideration for a significant
advancement of public knowledge.30
The statutory requirements for granting a patent monopoly are
comprised of two main components. First, the threshold inquiry asks
26 Edmund L. Andrews, Mad Scientists, Bus. MONTHLY 283 (May, 1990).
27 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). A patent monopoly lasts for 17 years and then the inven-
tion enters the public domain. See infra section II for a discussion of the statutory require-
ments for patents.
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
30 For an analysis of this exchange theory applied to biotechnology, see Thomas D.
Kiley, Patents on Random Complementay DNA Fragments?, 257 SCIENCE 915, 915 (1992).
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whether the claimed invention is patentable subject matter.31 Second,
although the subject matter in general may be patentable, the specific
invention itself must pass a tripartite inquiry for novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness.3 2
A. Patentable Subject Matter
Section 101 of title 35 of the U.S. Code states:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the con-
ditions and requirements of this title.33
This describes the entire scope of subject matter that is patenta-
ble under United States law. Accordingly, the threshold inquiry of all
patent applications is whether the claim can be classified within this
range.
Case law has established that patentable subject matter does not
include natural phenomenon,3 4 mathematical algorithms,3 5 or prod-
ucts of nature.3 6 Under this precedent, researchers feared that their
biotechnology claims would be rejected because they were products of
nature.
However, in the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty37 the
Supreme Court held that the results of biotechnology research were
patentable. The issue in that case was whether a micro-organism ge-
netically transformed with a gene that would break down oil was pat-
entable subject matter.3 8 In deciding that the bacterium was
patentable, the Court made three important conclusions that set the
stage for future biotechnology patents.
First, the Court was not concerned with whether the bacterium
was "manufacture" or "composition of matter" under section 101.39 A
precise classification of a biotech patent is not necessary as long as the
invention falls within the general scope of patentable subject matter.
31 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
32 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
33 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
34 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (newly discov-
ered natural principles are not patentable).
35 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (mathematical formulas are not patentable).
36 "[P]atents cannot issue fdr the discovery of the phenomena of nature .... [They]
are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at
130.
37 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
38 Id- at 305.
39 Id at 307-08.
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Second, the Court defined the general range of subject matter to
be wide. The Court noted the presumption that patents exist to pro-
vide incentives for research. 4° Genetic engineering then, may have
been unforeseen by Congress but was within the broad scope of legis-
lative purpose.41
Third, the Court provided a test to limit the bounds of patentable
subject matter. The key issue for the Court was that the bacterial
strain was nonnatural and a product of human ingenuity.42 The dis-
tinction between patentable and unpatentable claims is that of "prod-
ucts of nature versus human-made inventions."43
As a result, biotech claims can be patented where, for example, a
transformed organism does not exist in nature.44 Similarly, a natu-
rally occurring protein that exists only in minute and contaminated
quantities can be patented if isolated and purified.45 Although some
biotechnology inventions could conceivably exist in nature, such as by
some rare genetic event, the courts and the Patent Board46 have taken
a broad view toward granting patents for this subject matter.
B. Conditions for Patentability
While the general subject matter of a claim may be patentable,
the invention itself may not be worthy of a patent if it fails to satisfy
the three statutory requirements of usefulness, novelty, and nonobvi-
ousness. For example, suppose a certain micro-chip has been on the
market for years. Although micro-chips in general are patentable, this
40 Id. at 307.
41 Id. at 314-16.
42 Id. at 310.
43 Id. at 313.
44 An example of a patented transgenic organism is the transgenic Harvard mouse,
patent #4,736,866. A transgenic organism is one that expresses a gene not naturally found
in that species. See BiocHEMimmy, supra note 7, at 134 (describing transgenic mice).
45 One example is the purified human erythropoietin, Genetics Institute patent
#4,677,195. Although the district court initially held this patent to be valid, the Federal
Circuit held that the patent was invalid because GI's claimed method did not in fact result
in a pure form of erythropoietin. See Amgen, 927 F.2d. at 1216.
The Amgen cases brought to light another serious issue in biotechnology patent law.
Genetics Institute received a patent on the purified protein months before Amgen would
have been granted a patent on the protein product of the cloned gene. Although both
proteins are functionally identical, their discovery and isolation were the result of vastly
different research approaches. Current case law only allows a single patent for the protein.
A commentator has criticized this system for rewarding the less deserving inventor who is
the first to purify small and commercially valueless amounts of a protein at the expense of
the inventor who clones the gene so as to produce vast amounts of the useful protein. See
R. Stephen Crespi, Inventiveness in Biological Chemistry: an International Perspective PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 351, 358-59 (1990).
46 See, e.g., Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987), aftd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (denying on obviousness grounds a patent for a polyploid oyster created by a new
hydrostatic method. The Board did state that oysters, multi-cellular organisms, were con-
sidered appropriate subject matter for patents under Chakrabary).
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particular chip would not receive a patent. Since the microchip
claimed as an invention adds nothing new to public knowledge, it
would not be patentable. Compare this to a human being, which is
not patentable subject matter under any circumstances. 47 If an appli-
cation encompasses appropriate subject matter, a tripartite inquiry de-
termines whether that particular claim deserves the granting of a
patent.
Since the obviousness of biotechnology inventions has been the
most contentious matter, the usefulness and novelty inquiries have
not presented major analytical difficulties. This section briefly dis-
cusses the usefulness and novelty inquiries before fully analyzing the
nonobvious requirement.
1. Novelty
Section 101 of title 35 states that a patentable invention must be
"new."48 Section 102 lists the situations in which alleged novelty can
be refuted. Novelty analysis seeks to establish whether the claimed
invention existed and was available to the public prior to the inven-
tor's application. 49
If the examiner finds that the invention previously existed, the
claim fails for lack of novelty.50 The patent examiner can scour
"printed publication [s] in this or a foreign country"51 as well as patents
issued in the United States or abroad.52 In addition, a patent will be
denied for lack of novelty if "before the applicant's invention thereof
the invention was made in this country by another who had not aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed it."S5
Any prior revelation to the public of the invention will invalidate
the claim for lack of novelty. An invention must not actually exist and
be publicly accessible for a patent to issue. However, mere sugges-
47 Even if this was not the case under the patent statute, patenting a person would
violate the 13th amendment, which states that "[n] either slavery nor involuntary servitude
... shall exist within the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Patenting a person
would constitute "owning" that person.
48 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988): "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter... may obtain a patent therefor...."
49 Title 35 grants a 12 month grace period prior to application. 35 U.S.C. § 102. This
is intended to protect scientific publications from penalty. For instance, a scientist who
published the invention before applying for a patent would not be prevented from apply-
ing for 12 months. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Other countries are not so forgiving; in some
countries, and any entry of an invention into the public domain immediately precludes its
patentability.
50 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the
invention was known or used by others.., before the invention thereof by the applicant
51 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
52 Id.
53 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (1988).
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tions of the invention do not make it fail for lack of novelty. Sugges-
tions are evaluated under the inquiry into obviousness rather than
novelty.
Because the obviousness of biotechnology inventions has been
the most contentious matter for the courts, novelty inquiry has not
been a major issue. Additionally, the test is not easily applicable to
science as, for instance, each DNA sequence created in the lab is es-
sentially novel. The real issue in biotechnology concerns the related
question of obviousness. This will be analyzed after a brief discussion
of the utility requirement.
2. Utility
Title 35 states that an invention must be "new and useful"54 in
order to receive a patent. Because the statute does not explain this
requirement, the Courts have had to formulate standards on a case by
case basis. Recognizing the ambiguity of the word "useful," the
Supreme Court in 1966 laid down the criteria for patent utility in
Brenner v. Manson.55
In Brenner, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (now the Federal Circuit)56 and upheld the Patent
Board's rejection of a claim for lack of utility.57 The respondent, Man-
son, had claimed a patent for a synthesized compound. The class of
compounds that included his was being tested for possible tumor in-
hibiting effects. 58 The Court did not consider "current testing" to
meet the requirement of utility.
The Court made three statements that have impact on biotech-
nology applications. First, the Court did not believe that Congress in-
tended the term "useful" to be so broad as to include "any invention
not positively harmful."59 Second, simply being the object of scientific
inquiry did not establish utility.60 Third, the Court expressed concern
about the "quid pro quo" of granting a monopoly for a compound
with an unknown function. 61
Since the function of the compound was essentially unknown, the
public would not receive anything of substantive value in return for a
vast monopoly on future knowledge. 62 By emphasizing the quid pro
quo aspect of patents, the Court recognized the immense value of a
54 35 U.S.C. § 101.
55 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
56 For an explanation of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, see supra note 4.
57 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 519.
58 Id. at 531.
59 Id at 533.
60 Id. at 532-35.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 533-35.
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patent monopoly and the dangers of granting one where public
knowledge would not be significantly advanced. The Court aptly con-
cluded that "a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for
the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."63
Utility has only recently emerged as an issue for biotechnology
patent applications. Previous issues, such as the discovery of human
protein erythropoietin,64 reached the courts in large part because of
the vast commercial potential and utility of the product. Recent pat-
ent applications, however, such as those of the National Institute of
Health's for DNA sequences, have diluted the utility requirement.65
The Patent Office is currently deluged with applications for products
that may have little or no commercial utility.
3. Nonobviousness
The issue of obviousness has been the crux of biotechnology
cases decided in the Federal Circuit.66 Title 35 states that
[a] patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
67
This statutory requirement asks whether the invention would
have been readily apparent to a skilled worker in the particular field.
Conversely, inquiry into novelty seeks any previous public knowledge
of the invention. Analysis for obviousness examines all relevant prior
art68 to determine whether the claimed invention represents a signifi-
cant advance beyond what was already known.
In 1965, the Supreme Court set forth the modem test for obvi-
ousness in Graham v. John Deere Co.69 This test imposes three require-
ments: first, the court must survey the scope and content of the prior
art; second, it must examine the differences between the prior art and
63 Id. at 536 (citing Application of Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.PA. 1965)).
64 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
65 See Kiley, supra note 30, at 915-16 (criticizing the National Institute of Health's deci-
sion to apply for patents on segments of human genes).
66 The holdings of the four major biotechnology cases appealed to the Federal Circuit
hinged on the obviousness question.
67 35 U.S.C. § 103.
68 "Prior art" is a term of art that describes sources of information that focus on the
same subject matter as the invention. These may include scholarlyjoumals, issued patents,
and other analogous material that represent the state of knowledge in the field at the time
of the invention. The scope of references analyzed as "prior art" is narrower than that
analyzed for novelty. See generally Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965)
(describing the scope of prior art available to examiners for evaluating a patent claim).
69 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
19941]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the claimed invention; and third, it must determine the level of ordi-
nary skill in the art.7 0 The Federal Circuit added a fourth element of
secondary considerations to the three-pronged test.71 The secondary
considerations include commercial success, long felt but unsolved
need, and the failure of others to create the invention.7 2 Although
these considerations are not by themselves dispositive, they are highly
persuasive of nonobviousness.
Obviousness is currently the major issue in disputes over patent
protection for genetic inventions.7 3 For the past decade, the Federal
Circuit has decided the obviousness question without recognizing, or
acknowledging, the underlying mode of its analysis. This Note pro-
poses that the obviousness of an invention incorporating genetic in-
formation hinges on the availability of DNA sequences and methods
from the prior art.
III
THE FEDERAL CIRcurr's OBVIOUSNEss DocTRINE
Through a series of four cases, 74 the Federal Circuit has con-
fronted the question of obviousness in biotechnology inventions. De-
spite these four opportunities, the Federal Circuit has failed to
elucidate a precise analytic framework. This failure has spawned a
confusing framework of analysis for current biotechnology inventions.
As framed by the Federal Circuit's rhetoric, current analysis pur-
ports to focus on the actual biotechnology invention; that is, the end
product or discovery of scientific research. In each case, the court
initially provides a lengthy description of the invention. Then, the
court cites conventional precedent that analyzes actual inventions.
Notwithstanding the stated attempt at conventional analysis, the court
tends to shift focus from the end product of scientific research to the
actual research itself. Thus, the court determines obviousness, not by
the invention itself, but by the steps that gave rise to the invention.
The resultant confusion is two-fold. First, analysis under the ru-
bric of past nonbiotechnology precedents, while focusing on methods,
70 Id. at 17.
71 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 910-11 (discussing several decisions regarding the
obviousness of genetic inventions).
74 Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987) (assay using monoclonal antibodies is non-obvious); In re
O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (expression of fused foreign protein in bacteria is
obvious); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (DNA sequence for the erythropoietin protein is a non-obvi-
ous invention); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (expression of an insecticide
protein in cyanobacteria is nonobvious).
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fails to provide any guidelines for future biotechnology claims. Sec-
ond, the court's unspoken emphasis on scientific methods is far from
consistent.
A close analysis of the four Federal Circuit opinions reveals a con-
fused judicial framework. Although the Federal Circuit purports to
analyze the claimed invention product, the opinions are better under-
stood as focusing on the techniques and procedures that create the
discovery. This Note argues that the patentability of DNA sequences
should be considered in the context of the scientific methods em-
ployed to define the sequences.
A. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. (1986)7 5
In this patent infringement76 case involving monoclonal antibo-
dies,77 the Federal Circuit court reversed the district court's finding of
obviousness and reinstated the validity of the disputed patent. The
case was the court's first attempt to analyze the obviousness of a bio-
technology invention.
1. The Invention
The invention used certain, known proteins to attach to certain
molecules in an unknown solution. By their attachment to specific
molecules, the proteins can be used to measure the amount of those
molecules that are in the solution. Specifically, this was a process that
employed monoclonal antibodies in an immunoassay to measure the
concentration of certain antigens.
The body's immune system produces proteins called antibodies.
By attaching themselves to foreign molecules, antibodies target "in-
vading" molecules for destruction by the immune system.78 Each an-
tibody is highly specific for a certain molecule, or "antigen." Scientists
can use this site-specific affinity as "a tool to identify or label particular
cells or molecules and to separate them from a mixture." 79
Work by Nobel prize-winners Georges Kohler and Cesar Milstein
allowed the mass production of a single clone that produces a nearly
unlimited supply of identical antibodies for a known antigen.8 0 Previ-
ously, antibodies had to be purified from natural serum that con-
75 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
76 For a description of Federal Circuit jurisdiction, see supra note 4.
77 For an explanation of monoclonal antibodies technology, see infra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text.
78 Monoclona4 802 F.2d at 1368.
79 Id. at 136869.
80 This is achieved by fusing a myeloma cancer cell and spleen cells from mice that
have been injected with a particular antigen. The fusion product is called a "hybridoma"
and produces identical monoclonal antibodies, See BxocffMisTrry, supra note 7, at 895-97
(describing the development of monoclonal antibodies).
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tained thousands of other antibodies. This new technique produces
antibodies called "monoclonal antibodies."
Hybritech's invention was an immunoassay that utilized
monoclonal antibodies.8 ' The goal was to have a process for measur-
ing the quantity of a certain molecule in a solution. Hybritech
achieved this by developing monoclonal antibodies with a high affinity
for certain antigens. These monoclonal antibodies would sandwich
the antigen and create an insoluble complex that could be quickly
and accurately measured. 82
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., had developed its own immunoas-
say and was infringing on Hybritech's patent.83 Monoclonal chal-
lenged the validity of Hybritech's patent for this invention on various
grounds. Most importantly, Monoclonal claimed that the immunoas-
say would have been obvious in light of the prior art.8 4
2. The Analysis
Judge Rich's analysis represented the Federal Circuit's first at-
tempt at evaluating the question of biotechnology obviousness. Pur-
porting to analyze the "claimed invention,"8 5 the court instead
focused its approach on the scientific methods involved. This creates
a confusing framework of analysis.
The opinion opens with reference to conventional obviousness
precedent. The court cited both the Grahams6 factual inquiries8 7 and
the need to evaluate secondary considerations before determining ob-
viousness. 88 However, these conventional tests seemed to play little or
no role in the actual determination of obviousness. Instead, the bulk
of the opinion focuses on the availability of methods from the prior
art needed to perfect the invention.8 9
The determination of obviousness hinged on an analysis of the
scientific knowledge available in the prior art at the time of inven-
tion.90 In making this determination, the court evaluated three sets of
81 Monoclona4 802 F.2d at 1370.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1371.
84 For an explanation of "prior art," see supra note 68.
85 MonoclonaL 802 F.2d. at 1380.
86 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965).
87 Including the "scope and content of the prior art, level of ordinary skill in the art,
and the differences betvween the prior art and the claimed invention" (footnote omitted).
Monoclona, 802 F.2d at 1379-80.
88 "Objective evidence such as commercial success, failure of others, long-felt need,
and unexpected results must be considered before a conclusion of obviousness is reached
.. " Id. at 1380.
89 Id. at 1380-81. This can be generally categorized under the Graham requirements
as "the difference between the prior art and the claimed invention."
90 Id. at 1381.
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scientific work. First, the court examined a series of four articles that
predicted that monoclonal antibodies would be used in
immunoassays. 91
These bare predictions "[a]t most, . . are invitations to try
monoclonal antibodies in immunoassays but do not suggest how that
end might be accomplished."92 Although the articles suggested the
immunoassay invention, the court stated that "'obvious to try' is [an]
improper consideration in adjudicating [the] obviousness issue."93 In
other words, the articles did not reveal any scientific methods that
could be successfully carried out to create the invention.94 Mere sug-
gestion of an invention does not by itself lead to a finding of obvi-
ousness. While the concept of an immunoassay may have been
obvious to try, the actual realization of the invention is not obvious
without predictable, successful techniques. Without explicitly stating
it, the court recognized that the inventive step is not the concept of an
immunoassay, but the development of successful procedures for its
completion.
The second set of work evaluated by the court included the origi-
nal monoclonal antibody discovery, an article discussing antibody as-
says, and a patent for a polyclonal95 antibody sandwich assay.96 The
court found that this prior art, however, "indisputably does not sug-
gest using monoclonal antibodies in a sandwich assay in accordance
with the invention ... ."97 While the scientific knowledge revealed
various methods surrounding monoclonal antibody and sandwich as-
says, there was no suggestion to utilize them for the invention.
The court deemed the third set of scientific work the most perti-
nent. 98 This included an article reporting monoclonal antibodies of
high affinity and work that described investigating antibody binding
sites by use of an insoluble sandwich complex.99 The court concluded
that the binding site work was "qualitatively different than the claimed
invention [and] ... the.., article does not compensate for the sub-
stantial difference."100 The prior art, then, does not reveal successful
91 Id. at 1380.
92 Id.
93 Id. (quoting Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
94 Id. at 1380 ("To the extent the district court relied upon these references to estab-
lish that it would have been obvious to by... the court was in error.").
95 Polyclonal antibodies are those purified from natural serum. Monoclonal antibo-
dies are those derived from hybridoma technology. See supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
96 Monoclonal, 802 F.2d at 1380-81.
97 Id. at 1380.
98 Id. at 1381.
99 1& at 1373.
100 Id. at 1381 ("The [prior art] is directed to mapping epitopes [binding sites] on a
known quantity of antigen and the [invention] to determining the presence or concentra-
tion of an antigenic substance in a sample of fluid .. ").
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methods to achieve the invention. Furthermore, the "work in no way
suggests using monoclonal antibodies"101 such as those used in the
immunoassay.
Monoclonal reveals an emerging confusion in the Federal Circuit's
approach to biotechnology obviousness. Although analyzed under
the rubric of conventional precedent, the court's reasoning is better
understood as involving a two-factor test that focuses on scientific pro-
cedures. First, the prior art must contain a suggestion for the inven-
tion. Second, the prior art must reveal predictable techniques that
allow for successful realization of the invention. However, this test is
not readily apparent from the opinion. Additionally, the court used
conventional tests to focus on methods. For instance, the court used
objective evidence of commercial success to bolster the finding that
the immunoassay techniques were unavailable. 10 2 Commercial suc-
cess of a product does not necessarily follow from the availability of
techniques. Although valuable, techniques are not commercial prod-
ucts. The next case to reach the Federal Circuit failed to clarify this
confused framework.
B. In Re O'Farrell (1988)105
O'Earrell also combined conventional precedent with seemingly
unconventional analysis. O'Farrell reached the Federal Circuit after
the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and In-
fringements rejected O'Farrell's patent application on grounds of ob-
viousness. In this case, the prior art combined an explicit suggestion
for the invention and the availability of predictable methods to carry
out the suggestion. The court's analysis began to clarify the standard
for determining when an "obvious to try" invention is also legally obvi-
ous. Although its holding rests on the availability of scientific meth-
ods, the court again failed to acknowledge this determining factor.
1. The Invention
The invention involved manipulating a bacterium to produce a
protein from a completely different species. Specifically, the patent
application concerned a method for producing a foreign, fused pro-
tein in a transformed species of bacteria. 10 4 The process involved iso-
lating the stretch of DNA that codes for that protein and inserting it
into the bacterium. As with other genetic inventions, this concept is
much more complicated to achieve successfully in practice.
101 Id. (emphasis added).
102 Id. at 1382-84.
103 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
104 Id. at 895.
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Bacteria are single-celled organisms whose DNA exists in a sim-
pler form than that of multi-cellular organisms such as humans. 10 5 A
bacterial genome 10 6 includes small, circular sections of DNA called
plasmids. These plasmids allow manipulation of bacterial DNA. Plas-
mids can be isolated, manipulated, and reintroduced to the bacterial
species. 10 7
Because the biochemical machinery that replicates and translates
DNA is the same among all species, genes from one species can be
inserted into the genome of another. Thus, following a successful ex-
periment, a gene for a human protein can be expressed in a bacte-
rium. These genes from a foreign source are said to be heterologous
genes. Bacteria that contain foreign genes are said to be
transformr-e1 08
The claimed invention in O'Farrell was a method to produce suc-
cessfully a foreign protein in a transformed species of bacteria. 0 9
This was accomplished by creating a plasmid called a cloning vector.
This plasmid includes a portion of a gene indigenous to the bacteria.
Linked to this gene is the DNA for the desired protein." 0 Upon suc-
cessful insertion of the plasmid, the biochemical machinery of the
bacteria will recognize"' the indigenous gene and begin to express it.
Since the desired protein gene is physically linked to the host gene,
the bacterium will continue reading along the DNA and produce a
"fused" protein consisting of the indigenous and foreign protein.
2. The Analysis
The Federal Circuit's opinion evaluated the prior art and found
an explicit suggestion for the claimed invention. However, there is
some confusion about what the court considered to be prior art. The
"prior art" evaluated by the Court consisted of prior procedures and
methods. A more conventional approach would have focused on
prior inventions. Although the court purported to analyze the prior
invention, the opinion focused on the available scientific procedures.
105 See generally KMETON & GouLD, supra note 8, at 741.46 (describing the relatively
simple DNA structure of bacteria).
106 The genome is the total sum of an organism's DNA. The genome of eucaryotic
organisms (organisms other than bacteria) is wholly contained in complicated structures
called chromosomes. See id. at 618-19 (describing the structures of eucaryotic
chromosomes).
107 See id. at 730-33 (describing procedures for laboratory manipulation of plasmids).
108 Id at 738.
109 O'FarreU 853 F.2d at 895.
110 Id.
111 Not every stretch of DNA is expressed in an organism. Scientists overcome this
problem by linking the foreign gene to an indigenous gene that is known to be expressed.
Regulation of gene expression remains one of the most topical fields of genetic research.
See generally K ETON & GOuLD, supra note 8, at 742-56 (overview of gene regulation).
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In this case, the prior art consisted of a scientific article by the co-
inventors that described a method for making a cloning vector with a
regulated, indigenous gene." 2 The only significant difference be-
tween the article and the invention concerned the nature of the for-
eign gene used." 3 In the article, the researchers discussed using a
ribosomal RNA gene, which is not usually translated into protein,
while the invention substitutes a gene for a known, predetermined
protein." 4 Importantly, the article reported that the foreign DNA
(the gene for ribosomal RNA) was expressed in the form of a fused
protein." 5 Thus, the court concluded that the prior art provided de-
tailed methods and techniques that would have made the invention
obvious.
The court reached this conclusion by reasoning similar to the
Monoclonal opinion. First, the Court found a suggestion for the inven-
tion. Second, the court found techniques existing in the prior art that
supplied a reasonable chance of success. However, throughout the
opinion, the court failed to elucidate its method-based analysis.
The first stage of the court's analysis identified a suggestion for
the invention.116 The court found that the prior art "explicitly sug-
gested the substitution" of a known protein for the ribosomal RNA
gene. 17 As was shown in Monoclona4 mere suggestion is not enough
for a finding of obviousness. Consequently, the appellants argued
that the suggestions were merely invitations to attempt the experi-
ment. Furthermore, rejection of the claim would constitute "an appli-
cation of a standard of 'obvious to try' to the field of molecular
biology.""18 The Federal Circuit had previously rejected the "obvious
to try" standard 11 9
The court responded by pointing out that every obvious inven-
tion is also obvious to try.120 An invitation to attempt an experiment
may or may not make that experiment obvious. Thus, the court posed
the question: "[W] hen is an invention that was obvious to try neverthe-
112 OFarrell, 853 F.2d at 899-901.
"13 Id. at 901.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 900. Production of a fused foreign protein was the fundamental scientific
breakthrough that was claimed in this invention.
116 The article "further predicted that if a gene that codes for a protein were to be
substituted for the ribosomal RNA gene, 'a readthrough transcript might allow for exten-
sive translation of a functional eucaryotic polypeptide.'" Id, at 901.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 902.
119 Id. See, e.g., In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Geiger, 815 F.2d
686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
120 O'Farrell 853 F.2d at 903. In this sense, "obvious experiments" are a subset of those
experiments that are "obvious to try."
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less nonobvious?"12' The answer lies in the availability of predictable
techniques needed to realize the suggestion.
Given an explicit suggestion for an experiment, the court con-
cluded that an invention will be deemed obvious when the prior art
supplies "a reasonable expectation of success."1 22 The court gives two
scenarios where the given suggestion would not supply the requisite
detail.
In some cases, what would have been "obvious to try" would
have been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible
choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the
prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical
or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be
successful. In others, what was "obvious to try" was to explore a new
technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field
of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance
as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve
it.123
The scenarios described by the court can be characterized as an
analysis of scientific techniques made available by the prior art. With-
out providing an explanation, the court concluded that neither situa-
tion applied to the OEarrellinvention. 124 This Note proposes that this
conclusion can be better reached by focusing on the availability of
detailed techniques. For instance, in this case, the suggestion pro-
vided explicit and detailed methodology, 125 and not merely "general
guidance" or "numerous possible choices."126 The inventors were de-
nied patent protection because they previously "provid[ed] virtually all
of their method to the public without applying for a patent."127
The O'Farrell invention concerned a method for producing a
fused protein in transformed bacteria. The court found that the prior
art provided both an explicit suggestion and detailed methods to carry
out the invention with a reasonable expectation of success. The in-
vention was not only "obvious to try," but was in fact obvious. A pat-
tern that focused on the scientific methods and procedures thus
began to emerge. Underlying the court's opinion, this pattern of
analysis is consistent with the nature of biotechnology research. The
inventive step in this research is not the product, but rather the inno-
121 Id.
122 Id. at 904 (citingIn reLongi, 759 F.2d 887, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); In re Clinton, 527
F.2d 1226, 1228 (G.C.P.A. 1976).
123 O'Faregll 853 F.2d at 903 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
124 Id.
125 The article "contained detailed enabling methodology for practicing the claimed
invention, a suggestion to modify the prior art to practice the claimed invention, and evi-
dence suggesting that it would be successful." Id. at 902.
126 Id. at 903.
127 Id. at 904.
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vative techniques necessary for its discovery. Without fully recogniz-
ing its analysis, the court tended to focus on the availability of these
techniques. The next Federal Circuit case extended the analysis even
further and applied it to the ownership of actual DNA sequences.
C. Amgen v. Chugai (1991)128
The third case to reach the Federal Circuit again focused on the
availability of scientific methods. The contested patent in this case
concerned the discovery of the DNA sequences encoding the human
protein erythropoietin (EPO).129 Amgen Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.,
the owner, sued Genetics Institute, Inc. and Chugai, Inc. for infring-
ing the patent by producing EPO by recombinant DNA technology.
Chugai then challenged the validity of Amgen's patent for the DNA
sequences.130 'The finding of nonobviousness hinged on the availabil-
ity of the DNA sequences. Indirectly, the court recognized that the
discovery of DNA sequences hinged on the scientific methods avail-
able for their location and isolation. Thus, the court extended its
somewhat confused framework to inventions incorporating DNA
sequences.
1. The Invention
Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein that boosts red blood cell pro-
duction. Persons with anemia have a red blood cell deficiency and
some respond to treatment with erythropoietin.' 3 ' Through innova-
tive cloning techniques, Amgen scientists isolated and purified the
stretch of human DNA that codes for erythropoietin. 132 This isolated
DNA code constitutes the patent.
Although vitally important to biotechnology, cloning can be a
very complex endeavor for scientists. Cloning involves first discerning
the amino acid order of the desired protein. An approximate DNA
sequence can then be deduced and generated. This DNA sequence,
or "probe," can be used to find the exact chromosomal location of the
gene which can then be isolated and purified. The difficulty in clon-
ing erythropoietin was that the amino acid sequence was uncertain. 133
The strategy that finally succeeded was to use two sets of fully-
degenerate, or variable, probes for two different regions of the EPO
gene. Chugai and Genetics Institute contended that their scientists
128 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
129 Id. at 1203-04.
130 Id. at 1204.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1207.
133 Id. at 1206.
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were the first to conceive of this strategy.134 They also asserted that
the discovery of the EPO gene would have been obvious in light of the
prior art.
2. The Analysis
The Federal Circuit's opinion had two very important repercus-
sions for obviousness analysis. First, the court held that a DNA se-
quence could not be conceived as an invention until the gene
containing the sequence had been isolated. By so limiting the defini-
tion of "conception," the Court's reasoning necessarily focused on the
availability of DNA sequences and procedures. Second, the court
treated the scientific process of gene discovery as bearing on the issue
of obviousness.
The Amgen court's definition of an invention's conception is im-
portant for subsequent obviousness analysis. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102,
the first to conceive of an invention and then reduce that invention to
practice is the primary inventor. Having exercised due diligence in
reducing the conception to an invention, this person is entitled to a
patent' 3 5 Genetics Institute claimed that its scientist was the first to
conceive of the probing strategy of using two sets of probes and that
therefore they should be entitled to the patent and not the Amgen
scientist who actually discovered the erythropoietin DNA sequence.
The court rejected Genetics Institute's claim and held that the
conception of a DNA invention requires knowledge of the actual se-
quence.136 The first to invent a DNA invention must be the first to
make the sequences available. In this sense, "an inventor is unable to
establish a conception until he has reduced the invention to practice
through a successful experiment.., a simultaneous conception and
reduction to practice."137 The court reasoned that "until [the scien-
tist] had a complete mental conception of a purified and isolated DNA
sequence encoding EPO and a method for its preparation ... all he
had was an objective to make an invention."l38 This assertion recog-
nizes that the inventive step in a DNA sequence discovery is not con-
ceiving the idea of a certain gene product, but creating the actual
technical methods needed to realize that idea.
134 Id. Defendants assert that Amgen's work was not novel under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(1988). By being the first to conceive of the probing strategy, Genetics Institute contends
that they were the first inventors. Id.
135 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) ("In determining priority of invention there shall be consid-
ered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the inven-
tion, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce
to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.").
136 Id. at 1206.
137 Id.
138 Id. (emphasis added).
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The court also defined biotechnology conception as requiring ac-
tual knowledge of the DNA sequences. Although unstated by the
court, this definition logically implies that methods are required.
Without methods, the DNA sequence needed for conception would
be unavailable.
To extend the court's reasoning to its logical conclusion: since
conception of a DNA invention cannot occur until the actual sequence is dis-
covered, the invention cannot be obvious until the sequence is obviously con-
ceivable. To be obviously conceivable, the sequence must be readily
available by standard, predictable techniques. Obviousness, then,
should rest on the availability of the actual sequence. However, the
court fell short of reaching this conclusion.
The Amgen court still purported to use conventional analysis.
The logical extension of the court's definition of "conception" re-
quires an evaluation of methods. However, conventional obviousness
analysis looks at the end product of research, not the methods. This
contradiction is confusing and produces a tension within the opinion.
This tension is apparent in two ways. First, the court briefly acknowl-
edged that obviousness hinged on methods. Second, the court ap-
plied a standard of obviousness that began to focus on the availability
(by predictable methods) of the DNA sequences.
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit briefly recognized the methodologi-
cal focus of obviousness analysis. In a footnote, the court "note [s] that
both the district court and the parties have focused on the obvi-
ousness of a process for making the EPO gene, despite the fact that it
is products (genes and host cells) that are claimed in the patent, not
processes." 13 9 The court's brief comment acknowledges the method-
ological focus with neither approval nor disapproval. Nevertheless,
the court's subsequent analysis and the holding rely entirely on the
scientific methods available for discovery. Thus, the inventive step in
these experiments is not the idea of a certain gene discovery, but the
actual scientific methods needed to realize that idea.
The court then analyzed the obviousness of the methods to make a
finding that the EPO gene was a nonobvious invention. First, the
court recognized that prior art had suggested the probing strategy,
thereby making the method "obvious to try."140 This established, the
court then agreed with the district court that "there was no reasonable
expectation of success in obtaining the EPO gene by the method that
[the Amgen scientist] eventually used."141 Thus, the court found that
139 Id. at 1207 n.3.
140 Id. at 1207-08.
141 Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
756 [Vol. 79:735
NOTE-BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
the many pitfalls and difficulties in cloning techniques made the reali-
zation of the suggested idea not obvious. 142
The court's conclusion that the invention was not obvious can
best be interpreted by focusing on the scientific techniques in the
prior art. The DNA sequence for the EPO gene was not readily avail-
able by standard techniques. Therefore, the methods of discovery
supplied by the prior art would not stand a reasonable chance of suc-
cess. This approach to obviousness discards the conventional focus on
the invention itself. Instead, the approach recognizes that the inven-
tive step in biotechnology is not the end product of research, but the
research itself. The final case to reach the Federal Circuit extends the
confusion and tension between conventional analysis and the more
useful focus on methods.
D. In re Vaeck (1991)143
In this case, the district court had rejected a patent claim on
grounds of obviousness. The Federal Circuit reversed this finding and
held that the invention was not obvious as there was neither a sugges-
tion from the prior art nor a "reasonable expectation of success" for
the experiment.144 The case purports to hinge on the detail of the
"suggestion" for an invention. Yet the analysis focuses on the method-
ology revealed by the prior art. A more explicit recognition of this
analysis would better serve the opinion.
1. The Invention
The Bacillus bacteria produce a protein that is toxic to insects and
useful for clearing insects from swampy areas. Unfortunately, Bacillus
lives at the bottom of swamps where insects are not exposed to it. Cya-
nobacteria, a much less studied species, grow on the swamp surface
where they can be consumed by insects.145
The scientists in Vaeck took an isolated Bacillus insecticidal gene
and combined it with a stretch of DNA from cyanobacteria to create a
"chimeric gene."146 This stretch of DNA allowed expression of the
foreign protein in cyanobacteria. Subsequently, scientists successfully
transformed cyanobacteria with a plasmid containing the insecticidal
chimeric gene. The difficulty with these experiments lay in the differ-
ence between cyanobacteria and Bacillus and the lack of knowledge
142 Id.
143 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
144 Id. at 495.
145 Id. at 489.
146 Id at 489-90. The name chimeric DNA comes "[f]rom chimera, a mythological crea-
ture with the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent." BIocHEMISTRY,
supra note 7, at 125.
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about the cyanobacteria genus.' 47 Because of the difficulties in the
experiments, the Court found the invention not to be obvious' 48
2. The Analysis
The analysis in Vaeck focused on methods revealed by the prior
art and the availability of chimeric genes. In addition, the opinion
recognized both explicit and implicit suggestions. Unfortunately, the
analysis confuses a suggestion that an experiment is "obvious to try"
with the availability of methods and sequences to make that experi-
ment possible. Although the holding rests on the availability of suc-
cessful methods, the opinion blurs the distinction between this and
the suggestion to try an experiment.
The Patent and Trademark Office determined that the invention
would have been obvious in light of two sets of scientific work. The
first was an article 49 describing the successful expression of a chi-
meric gene in cyanobacteria. The chimeric gene comprised an antibi-
otic marker gene' 50 and a chloroplast promoter sequence.' 51 The
second set was three articles that described expression of Bacillus in-
secticidal proteins in other bacterial hosts. The Patent Office reasoned
that it would have been obvious to substitute the three described Bacil-
lus genes for the marker gene in the chimeric plasmid described
above.' 52 This would result in high level expression of Bacillus genes
in transformed cyanobacteria. 153
In an opinion by Judge Rich, the Federal Circuit reversed the
finding of obviousness.' 54 The court initially declared that "a proper
analysis . . . requires, inter alia, consideration of two factors: (1)
whether the prior art would have suggested... that they should make
the [invention]; and (2) whether the prior art would also have re-
vealed that in so making or carrying out, those of ordinary skill would
have a reasonable expectation of success." 155 By focusing on the
147 Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 494.
148 Id. at 494-95.
149 Id. at 490 n.6 (citing 12 Nucleic Acids Res. 8917 (1984)).
150 This confers resistance to a certain antibiotic that would normally inhibit bacteria.
Antibiotic resistance genes can be used as markers to check for successful insertion of a
foreign plasmid into a host bacteria. For instance, if the marker gene is put on the plas-
mid, only successfully transformed bacteria have that gene. Exposure of the bacterial sam-
ple to the antibiotic will kill off the non-transformed cells and leave only the bacteria with
the plasmid. These then can be isolated and studied.
151 A promoter is a regulatory sequence that allows the expression of a certain gene.
The promoter's function is to provide a recognition and attachment site for the enzyme
that initiates the process of "decoding" the gene sequence. See generally BIoc:HEMIsTRY,
supra note 7, at 98 (generally describing transcription of DNA).
152 Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 492.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 496.
155 Id. at 493 (quoting In re Dow Chemical Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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methodology needed for chimeric gene expression, the court found
that neither of these factors was present and therefore the invention
was nonobvious. 56
The court distinguished O'Earrel1 57 by noting that the invention
at issue in that case involved an explicit suggestion and detailed en-
abling methodology, thus making the invention obvious.' 58 In con-
trast, "the prior art in this case offers no suggestion, explicit or
implicit, of the substitution that is the difference between the claimed
invention and the prior art."159 Focusing on the scientific methods
needed to successfully transform cyanobacteria with an insecticidal
gene, the court found no implicit suggestion in the prior art.
Referring to the first article of prior art, the court declared that
[t] he expression of [a marker gene] in cyanobacteria, without more,
does not render obvious the expression of unrelated genes in cya-
nobacteria for unrelated purposes." 160 This is because "it is only in
recent years that the biology of cyanobacteria has been clarified."' 61
While the idea for a chimeric gene may be straightforward, the inven-
tion was not obvious because the scientific methods for manipulating
cyanobacteria were unpredictable. 162
If methods for manipulating cyanobacteria were interchangeable
with those for other bacterial strains, then the conclusion would be
different. The substitution of cyanobacteria for other bacteria to ex-
press the gene would have been implicitly obvious. Since the knowl-
edge was poor and methods unpredictable, the court found that there
was no implicit suggestion for the invention.
The court looked to those same unpredictable methods to find
that there was no "reasonable expectation of success."163 This finding,
however, was really only an afterthought. The court devotes the vast
bulk of its analysis to explain why the prior art did not implicitly sug-
gest the invention because of the uncertainty in manipulating
cyanobacteria.
Unfortunately, this analysis confuses the distinction between a
"suggestion for an invention" and a "reasonable chance for its suc-
cess." Perhaps a better approach would have been to find that the
156 Id. at 496.
157 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
158 Vaeck, 947 F. 2d at 494-95.
159 Id. at 495.
160 Id. at 493.
161 Id. at 494.
162 "The molecular biology of these organisms has only recently become the subject of
intensive investigation and this work is limited to a few genera. Therefore the level of
unpredictability regarding heterologous gene expression in this large, diverse, and rela-
tively poorly studied group of procaryotes is high." Id. at 493 (quoting the patent
examiner).
163 Id. at 495.
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prior art had indeed implicitly suggested the substitution of an insecti-
cidal gene for a marker gene in cyanobacteria. This would make the
invention "obvious to try." The court could then have examined
whether available methods predicted a "reasonable expectation of
success."
This approach could utilize the "obvious to try/obvious" distinc-
tions described in O'FarrelL It also could build on a framework, drawn
from Amgen and Hybritech, that emphasizes the need to determine the
availability of sequences and methods. While the result reached would
be the same, the court could have explicitly recognized and described
the method-based standard for DNA inventions. This would clarify
future analysis and remedy the vagueness of the obviousness standard.
IV
THE FuTuRE OF OBvIousNEss ANALYSIS
There is a need for a clear and practical standard with which to
evaluate the obviousness of biotechnology inventions. Such a stan-
dard would both ease congestion at the Patent Office and create
greater predictability for the biotechnology industry. With the large
costs of modem science, research funds are far better spent on actual
research than financing excessive litigation occasioned by vague pat-
entability criteria. By formulating a clear standard of method and se-
quence availability, the Federal Circuit may be able to achieve these
two goals.
A. The Need for a Clear Obviousness Standard
A clear obviousness standard would serve two important goals in
biotechnology research. First, it would help ease the patent applica-
tion process. Second, it would increase the predictability of success in
patent applications. This would reduce litigation costs and encourage
more industry investment in biotechnology research.
Faced with a backlog of cases, the Patent Office has applied over-
broad, general rules to specific claims. While this may be an under-
standable reaction to a large backlog of claims, it has led to unduly
expansive interpretations of the case law.
The Patent Office is indeed swamped with biotechnology applica-
tions. Michael Gough, manager of the Office of Technology's Biologi-
cal Applications Program, testified before the House Subcommittee
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration that the backlog
of cases is a continuing source of controversy and an impediment to
U.S. biotechnology.'6 Moreover, the backlog is continually growing
164 "Partnership with Industry is Essential for U.S. Biotechnology," MH Officials Say, 43 Bu-
reau of Nat'l Aff., Inc., Patent, Trademark & CopyrightJ. 65, 67 (1991).
[Vol. 79:735
NOTE-BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
since the Patent Office is unable to train and retrain qualified examin-
ers.165 In fact, one witness stated that "despite heroic efforts,"1 66 the
Patent and Trademark Office today is desperately short of examining
resources. As a result, the pendency of a biotechnology application
may be up to five years, according to Reid Adler, the director of Na-
tional Institute of Health's technology transfer department. 167
Faced with this volume of work, the Office needs a clear frame-
work of precedent with which to analyze the obviousness of biotech-
nology applications. The Commissioner of the Patent Office, Harry
Manbeck, has testified that he and the Patent Office support legisla-
tion that would clarify the evaluation of biotechnology patent claims.
At a House subcommittee hearing, he stated that administrative costs
are high and the case law in the biotechnology field is generally
unclear.168
As well as encouraging application efficiency, a clear obviousness
standard is also important for the industries that fund highly expen-
sive modem science. Funds for biotechnology research are limited,
yet the legal costs of patenting are great.169 Funding now allocated to
processing and litigating patents can be better directed to medical re-
search and other scientific endeavors. For example, Amgen Co.'s
legal costs in its battle with Genetics Institute over the erythropoietin
(EPO) patent were at least $10 million.170 This represents 10% of the
costs for developing EPO. A system that fosters spending this much to
cope with a legal morass is flawed.
165 Id.
166 Biotechnology Patent Protection Act, Hearing on H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664 before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciar, 101st Cong., 2nd sess. 41 (1990) [hereinafter Biotechnology Patent Protection Act
Hearing] (testimony of Robert A. Armitage, Upjohn Co.).
167 Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents, Round Two, 255 SCIENCE 912, 913 (1992).
168 Biotechnology Patent Protection Act Hearing, supra note 166, at 17-19 (testimony
of Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Asst. Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce). This reasoning was answered quite directly by Donald Banner,
President of Intellectual Property Owners Inc., in the same hearing.
We heard also about the great advantage of reducing the workload of
the Patent and Trademark Office and what a nice idea that would be. Well,
you know, when you think about it, you could just allow all the patents.
Wouldn't that be fun? They wouldn't have anything to do. We would save
money in the Patent Office, but what chaos would that create in the real
world?
Id. at 89.
169 See, e.g., Clive Cookson & Julie Clayton, Of Mice, Men, and Money: Legal Action over
Patent Disputes Threatens to Stifle Investment in Biotechnology, FiN. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at 18
(reporting that total worldwide spending on biotechnology patent costs probably exceeds
$100 million annually).
170 Edmund L. Andrews, Mad Scientists, Bus. MONTHLY, May 1990, at 283, 287 (describ-
ing Amgen's legal battle with Chuga and Genetics Institute).
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Minimizing legal costs will encourage more research and permit
lower prices for the resulting products. Establishing clear guidelines
for patentability will help achieve these goals. If the law is clear, com-
panies and institutions will not have to fight legal battles to establish
their rights. Additionally, this may encourage more industry invest-
ment in both private and university-based research. Thus, both the
patent office and the biotechnology industry would benefit from a
clear obviousness standard. However, the pace of scientific research
exceeds that ofjudicial or Patent Office decisions. 17' For this reason,
some "bright line" rules may be inappropriate for emerging technolo-
gies. What is needed is a standard that is both clear and adaptable to
new discoveries and research.
B. The Availability Doctrine-Clarity and Adaptability
This Note proposes a framework for obviousness analysis that is
both clear and adaptable. Clarity can arise from a lucid explanation
of the standard and its application in past decisions. This proposed
standard is adaptable to future discoveries because of its focus on sci-
entific methods.
At first, this focus on the methods and techniques may seem
counter-intuitive. Why should one look at the process of creating an
invention when the obviousness of the invention itself is being ques-
tioned? The answer lies in the nature of DNA sequences. DNA se-
quences exist wholly apart from scientific attempts to manipulate
them. These inventions are in essence "discoveries" of existing DNA
information.172 The inventive step is not the general conception of an
invention that utilizes DNA, but the actual discovery and isolation of
the specific DNA sequences.
To this point, the Federal Circuit has ignored the centrality of
research procedures to biotechnology inventions. This has produced
confusion and a tension within the opinions. This Note proposes to
171 [L] andmark court decisions in patent law deal with the state of the art of 5
to 10 years earlier. Fundamentally, advances in patent law lag behind devel-
opments in science.... This is particularly significant for biotechnology,
where new medical or industrial technologies emerge before basic ques-
tions of patentability are even framed clearly.
Reid G. Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expectations for Knowledge and Commer-
cialization, 257 ScIENcE 908, 909 (1992).
172 Pure discoveries of nature are not patentable. See supra note 36. However, isolated
and purified DNA is deemed not to be in a natural state. For instance, eucaryotic genomic
DNA contains stretches of introns that are not translated into protein. By obtaining the
mRNA copy of a certain gene, scientists can use the enzyme reverse transcriptase to obtain
the translated DNA sequence for that gene. This sequence without introns, called cDNA,
does not exist in nature and so can be said to be an invention. Thus, any in vitro manipula-
tion of DNA can be said to create a non-natural, human invention.
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resolve this confusion by focusing explicitly on available scientific
procedures.
The proposed framework can be divided into two sections. The
initial inquiry searches for a suggestion for the claimed invention
from the prior art. This suggestion can be either explicit, as in
OTarrell, or implicit, as in Vaeck Once a suggestion has been found,
the invention can be deemed "obvious to try." This threshold analysis
is not stringent because most biotechnology inventions can be charac-
terized as obvious to try.113 The second stage of the analysis deter-
mines whether or not an "obvious to try" invention is also legally
obvious.174
The second stage of the analysis evaluates the reasonable expecta-
tion of success of the "obvious to try" invention. This is accomplished
by evaluating the availability of the discovery. For patents claiming
DNA sequences, standard, predictable techniques may make the spe-
cific gene sequence readily accessible. If a gene sequence is readily
available, the invention stands a reasonable chance of success. Thus,
by focusing on scientific techniques, the Court can analyze availability.
A claimed discovery/invention that is readily available is obvious.
This stage of the analysis can be applied to Amgen, O'Farrell, and
Monoclonal. In Monoclonal, the prior art did not provide sufficient
methodology for making the sandwich assay readily available. 175 In
OTarrell, the prior art provided explicit procedures for making the
hybrid vector readily available to a skilled geneticist.176 In Amgen, the
erythropoietin DNA sequence was not readily available by any known
scientific methods.' 77 Although the Vaeck court found no suggestion
in the prior art, the case might be better analyzed as an "obvious to
try" invention that had no reasonable chance of success. This is so
because the prior art made available neither the methods nor DNA
sequences necessary to create a chimeric insecticidal gene in
cyanobacteria.'78
Under this analysis, the decisions in all four of the Federal Circuit
cases should turn on the reasonable chance of success of each inven-
173 For instance, cloning a medically useful gene is a straightforward general idea.
This would be "obvious to try." Successfully accomplishing this goal though may not be so
"obvious."
174 Of course, a biotechnology invention that was so unique that it could not be
deemed "obvious to try" should not move to the second stage of inquiry. These inventions,
however, would likely not reach this level of litigation over the obviousness issue.
175 "At most, these articles are invitations to try monoclonal antibodies in immunoas-
says but do not suggest how that end might be accomplished." Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
947 (1987).
176 See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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tion. The court should scrutinize the scientific methods revealed by
the prior art. Only by careful evaluation of each method and proce-
dure should the Court determine obviousness. Scientists do not dis-
cover useful inventions by hypothesis alone. Rather, biotechnology
discoveries hinge on the careful development of successful and crea-
tive methods. By focusing explicitly on these methods, the court can
determine whether the invention would have been obvious to a scien-
tist in the relevant field.
This standard can adapt to emerging technologies because of its
focus on methodology. New scientific procedures lie at the forefront
of biotechnology discoveries. Inventions arise from new methods of
discovering and manipulating genetic information. 79 By analyzing
scientific methods and not general ideas, the standard can remain ap-
plicable to emerging technologies. As scientific knowledge continues
to grow and expand, the focus on methods can be applied to inven-
tions from other fields of research.
CONCLUSION
Biotechnology and the exploration of genetic processes have cre-
ated much exciting research. These discoveries can result in medical,
agricultural, and other applications of tremendous importance. Pat-
ents have emerged as a method for protecting and owning some of
this valuable knowledge. Of the various statutory requirements, obvi-
ousness has become the most contested.
An emerging pattern underlies the Federal Circuit's approach to
the obviousness of biotechnology inventions. The court could signifi-
cantly clarify this pattern by acknowledging the importance of scien-
tific methods. This Note argues that for a finding of obviousness, an
invention must meet a two part test. First, the invention must be
either explicitly or implicitly suggested in the prior art. Second, there
must be readily available methods to achieve the suggestion with a
reasonable chance of success. To illustrate, in a claim for a DNA se-
quence, the invention would have been obvious if the sequence was
accessible by readily available methods.
This standard of "available methods" has not been fully clarified
by the Federal Circuit. By fully acknowledging the importance of sci-
entific techniques, and not products, the court can create a doctrine
that is both consistent and practical. This would alleviate Patent Of-
179 The genetic code holds far more information than just single gene to single pro-
tein structures. Research is beginning to uncover vast, complicated regulatory and struc-
tural systems and gene "families."
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fice congestion, reduce litigation costs, and encourage more invest-
ment in biotechnology.
Brian C. Cannont
t I would like to thank Professor Richard Beresford for his comments on my note.

Cornell
Journal of Law
and Public PolicyU
The Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy addresses current
domestic legal issues and their implications in the fields of
government, public policy, and the social sciences. The Journal
publishes two issues (Fall and Spring) each academic year.
Issue 3:2 (available June 1994) includes articles on
domestic violence as a factor in custody determinations
and the "third wave" of the disability rights movement.
Issue 4:1 (available January 1995) will include articles
from our Journal-sponsored symposium entitled:
"Employee Participation Plans: The Key to U.S.
Competitiveness or Erosion of Workers' Rights?"
Subscriptions: Subscriptions are $16.00 per volume or $8.00 per
issue. Back issues are available from the Journal.
Manuscripts: The Journal invites the submission of unsolicited
articles, studies and commentaries.
Contact the Journal at: Cornell Journal of Law and Public
Policy, Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca, New York
14853-4901, Telephone: (607) 255-0526; or via Internet:
PUBPOL@LAW.MAIL.CORNELL.EDU.
Copyright © 1994 by Cornell University

THE CORNELL LAW SCHOOL
MYRON TAYLOR HALL
Officers of Administration
Russell K. Osgood, B.A, J.D., Dean of the Law Faculty and Professor of Law
Charles W. Wolfram, Acting Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Charles Frank Reavis Sr.
Professor of Law
Anne Lukingbeal, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean and Dean of Students
Frances M. Bullis, B.A., MA, Associate Dean for Development and Public Affairs
Richard D. Geiger, B.S., J.D., Assistant Dean and Dean of Admissions
Charles D. Cramton, BA, MA,J.D., Assistant Dean for Alumni and International Affairs
Claire M. Germain, M.A., LL.B., M.C.L., M.L.L., Edward Cornell Law Librarian and
Professor of Law
John J. Hasko, BA, MA, J.D., M.S., Associate Law Librarian
Faculty
Kathryn Abrams, BA, J.D., Professor of Law
Gregory S. Alexander, BA,J.D., Professor of Law
C. Edwin Baker, BA, J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1993)
JohnJ. Barcel6 III, BA, J.D., SJ.D., A. Robert Noll Professor of Law
Paul D. Bennett, BA,J.D., Lecturer (Clinincal Studies)
H. Richard Beresford, BA, J.D., M.D., Visiting Professor of Law (1993-94)
RichardJ. Bonnie, BA, LL.B., Visiting Professor of Law (1993-94)
Thomas R. Bruce, BA, MA, Research Associate in Legal Technology
Kevin M. Clermont, A.B., J.D., James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law
Roger C. Cramton, A.B., J.D., Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law
Yvonne M. Cripps, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1993)
Alexander N. Domrin, Ph.D. in Law, Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Theodore Eisenberg, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law (Sabbatic Spring 1994)
Cynthia R. Farina, BA, J.D., Professor of Law
David D. Friedman, BA, M.S., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law (1993-94)
Glenn G. Galbreath, B.A.,J.D., Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies)
Claire M. Germain, MA, LL.B., M.C.L., M.L.L., Edward Cornell Law Librarian and
Professor of Law
Robert A. Green, BA, M.S., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
James J. Hanks, Jr., A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Visiting Practitioner (Fall 1993)
Herbert Hausmaninger, Dipl. Dolm., Dr. Jur., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
George A. Hay, B.S., M.A., Ph.D., Edward Cornell Professor of Law and Professor of Economics
James A. Henderson,Jr., A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law
Jennifer G. Hill, BA, LLB., BCL, Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Robert A. Hillman, BA, J.D., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law
(Sabbatic Spring 1994)
BarbaraJ. Holden-Smith, BA, J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Sheri Lynn Johnson, BA, J.D., Professor of Law
Lily Kahng, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Associate Professor of Law
Robert B. Kent, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law, Emeritus
Jack Lipson, BA, J.D., Visiting Practitioner (Spring 1994)
David B. Lyons, BA, MA, Ph.D., Professor of Law and Philosophy (on Leave 1993-94)
Jonathan R. Macey, BA, J.D., J. DuPratt White Professor of Law
Peter W. Martin, A.B., J.D., Jane M.G. Foster Professor of Law
JoAnne M. Miner, BA,J.D., Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies) and Director of Cornell
Legal Aid Clinic
Peter-Christian Mfiller-Graff, Dr. Jur., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Hiroshi Oda, LL.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1993)
Russell K. Osgood, BA, J.D., Dean of the Law Faculty and Professor of Law
Larry I. Palmer, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law (on leave 1993.94)
Ernest F. Roberts, Jr., BA, LL.B., Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law
Faust F. Rossi, A.B., LL.B., Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques
Bernard A. Rudden, BA, MA, Ph.D., LLD., DCL, Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1993)
StewartJ. Schwab, BA, MA,J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law
Robert F. Seibel, A.B., J.D., Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies)
Howard M. Shapiro, BA, J.D., Associate Professor of Law (on Leave Spring 1994)
Steven H. Shiffrin, B.A., MA, J.D., Professor of Law
John A. Siliciano, BA, M.PA, J.D., Professor of Law
GaryJ. Simson, BA, J.D., Professor of Law
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, B.A.,J.D., Professor of Law
Joseph Straus, Diploma in Law, J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Barry Strom, B.S.,J.D., Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies)
Robert S. Summers, B.S., LL.B., William G. McRoberts Research Professor in the Administration of
the Law
Winnie F. Taylor, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Jamesjustesen White, BA,J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
David Wippman, B.A., MA, J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Charles W. Wolfram, A.B., LL.B., Acting Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Charles Frank
Reavis Sr. Professor of Law
Faculty Emeriti
Harry Bitner, A.B., B.S., L.S., J.D., Law Librarian and Professor of Law
W. David Curtiss, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
W. Tucker Dean, A.B., J.D., M.BA, Professor of Law
W. Ray Forrester, A.B., J.D., LL.D., Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law
Jane L Hammond, BA., M.S. in LS., J.D., Edward Cornell Law Librarian and Professor of Law
Harry G. Henn, A.B., LL.B., J.S.D., Edward Cornell Professor of Law
Milton R. Konvitz, B.S., MA, J.D., Ph.D., Litt.D., D..L, LH.D., LLD., Professor, New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Robert S. Pasley, A.B., LL.B., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, LL.B., Dr. Jur., William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and
Comparative Law
Gray Thoron, A.B., LLB., Professor of Law
Elected Members from Other Faculties
Calum Carmichael, Professor of Comparative Literature and Biblical Studies, College of Arts and
Sciences
James A. Gross, Professor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Paul R. Hyams, Associate Professor of History, College of Arts and Sciences
